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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DEFECTIVE MILK BOTTLE-LIABILITY OF
BOTTLER.-A milk bottle fell apart in plaintiff's hand during the
performance of ordinary household duties. In an action against de-
fendant dairy, the complaint was dismissed 1 on the ground that there
was "no substantial evidence of a causal relation between some act
or omission by the defendant in the preparation of the bottle . . .
and the injury by its use.... ." Plaintiff relied on the following evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case: the testimony of an expert
witness that (1) a crack was in the bottle prior to its falling apart;
(2) such a crack was one typically caused by a thermal shock; (3)
the crack could have been discovered by defendant had it used a
thermal shock test or an examination by polariscope; and (4) that
the crack could not have occurred after the bottle left defendant's
control. Defendant's evidence consisted of testimony that: (1) it
followed an inspection process similar to that which was accepted by
other bottlers in the industry; (2) the crack would have been noticed,
during the process of vacuum filling, if it was there at or before that
time. Held, affirmed. There was no evidence that while the bottle
was in defendant's possession it was in any way defective or that the
defendant had knowledge or notice of a defect therein. Sntolen v.
Grandview Dairy, Inc., 301 N. Y. 265, 93 N. E. 2d 839 (1950).
When a defective chattel is being used for its intended purpose
and causes an injury, the manufacturer or assembler thereof is liable
if he failed to exercise reasonable care to protect parties likely to be
injured by it.2 The burden was upon the plaintiff to establish by a
preponderance of evidence that the defendant negligently failed to
take reasonable precautions to protect plaintiff from the consequences
of a broken bottle. Defendant was bound to use ordinary, customary
methods to detect defects from which something more than trivial
danger could be foreseen.3
The courts apparently apply a different rule to bottles charged
with gas and bottled under pressure than to ordinary glass containers
such as the one used in the instant case. In the former, evidence
that defendant complied with the testing standard ordinarily used by
other bottlers is insufficient, standing alone, to absolve him from
liability.4 While in the latter, it would seem from the instant case
that it is sufficient 5 in the absence of evidence that: (1) the bottle
' Trial term rendered judgment, in favor of plaintiff, upon verdict of jury,
which was reversed on the law and the facts. Smolen v. Grandview Dairy,
Inc., 276 App. Div. 854, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 382 (2d Dep't 1949).
2 It is no longer necessary to prove a privity of contract and the fact that
the chattel was inherently dangerous. Under the modem rule of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), liability is based
on the potentiality of danger caused by negligent workmanship. Rosebrock
v. General Elec. Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923).
s Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932).
4Ibid. Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co 274 App. Div. 201, 80
N. Y. S. 2d 635 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N. Y. 879, 84 N. E. 2d 639 (1949).5 Cullem v. Renken Dairy Co., 247 App. Div. 742, 285 N. Y. Supp. 707
(2d Dep't 1936).
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was defective when it first reached defendant's hands and that defen-
dant failed to discover the defect; or, (2) defendant's handling of the
bottle caused the defect and that defendant permitted it to go un-
noticed. But direct evidence of the above facts is generally unobtain-
able because of the vast number of bottles generally handled by a
person in defendant's position 6 and because such facts if they did
exist would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant or
his agents. Therefore, the rule is that direct evidence need not be
introduced; 7 the plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. 8
Plaintiff attempted to prove negligence by showing that defen-
dant's method of inspection, although it was the one customarily used
in the industry, was not the best and that there were other tests that
would have exposed a thermal shock fracture in the bottle. If all
of plaintiff's evidence is accepted as true, the instant case is correctly
decided since the applicable rule of law under this given set of facts
is that defendant merely perform the ordinary tests used by the rest
of the industry.9 Defendant is not bound to use a better method
simply because one exists.10
The dissent argued that the defendant's negligence is a question
of fact for the jury to decide, on the ground that the customary way
of doing things may be the negligent way 11 and that the industry
should not be protected from liability by a custom which it has de-
veloped for its own exemption.12
While the majority opinion is logically in accord with stare
decisis, it is submitted that the dissent is sociologically sound in that
it demands that more than a minimum protection be afforded the
public.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LAST CLEAR CHANcE. - Plaintiff's in-
testate, a ten year old boy, accompanied by his twelve year old
brother, hitched a ride on defendant's truck. The boys crouched on
a step fastened to the right front fender, out of the driver's sight,
and held onto a perpendicular rod attached to the body of the truck
6 Licari v. Markotos, 110 Misc. 334, 180 N. Y. Supp. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
7 Saglimbeni v. West End Brewing Co., 274 App. Div. 201, 80 N. Y. S.
2d 635 (3d Dep't 1948), aff'd, 298 N. Y. 875, 84 N. E. 2d 638 (1949).
s Ibid.
9 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932) ; Curley
v. Ruppert, 272 App. Div. 441, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 578 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Luciano v.
Morgan, 267 App. Div. 785, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 502 (2d Dep't 1943).
10 Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N. Y. 290, 190 N. E. 643 (1934).
11 Shannahan v. Empire Eng. Corp., 204 N. Y. 543, 98 N. E. 9 (1912);
Bennett v. Long Island R. R., 163 N. Y. 1, 57 N. E. 79 (1900).
12 Ibid.
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